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SEARCH BY CONSENT;
ENTRANCE GAINED BY FRAUD
AND DECEIT; EAVESDROPPING
AND WIRE TAPPING
by Jerold H. Israel*
My topics this morning are eavesdropping, search by consent and
entrance gained by fraud and deceit. You should be forewarned that
these are areas in which the law has been "on the move" for the past
few years. Changes have occurred and still more will take place in the
future. I will attempt to anticipate some of those developments, but,
obviously, the only safe course is keeping up-to-date through continuing
education. In covering my assigned topics, I hope to paint with a rather
broad brush. It has always been my feeling that the pohce officer cannot
be expected to learn all the minor rules, exceptions to the mles and ex-
ceptions to exceptions that a defense lawyer or prosecutor must have at
his command. I hope to present a general picture of the difficult problems
presented in these areas and suggest means that may be used to avoid
those problems.
Although my first subject is simply Hsted as eavesdropping, I would
like to expand upon that topic to consider also the closely related problem
of secret observation. As a practical matter, clandestine observation may
be as valuable an inventory technique as clandestine listening. In consider-
ing these techniques together, I intend to point up similarities in legal
treatment. It should be made clear, however, that, while closely related,
the legal problems each presents are not identical.
As you all know, the Fourth Amendment prohibits illegal searches
and seizures, and requires that the fruits thereof be excluded from evi-
dence. It is sometimes said, however, that you can only have an illegal
search and seizure when there is a physical seizure of property. Thus
it noted that no problems are presented when an officer looks tlirough
the window of a car, sees the occupant using narcotics, and later testifies
to that fact; or the similar situation when an officer looking through the
window of a street storefront, sees someone burglarizing the store, and
later testifies to that fact. While it is true that these cases do not present
""Mr. Israel is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law
School, Co-repoi-ter of the Michigan Bar Association Committee for the Revision of
the Criminal Lata, and formerly was Visiting Lata Professor, Stanford University and
Law Clerk to Mr. Justice Potter Stewart, United States Supreme Court.
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serious legal problems,^ that does not sustain the position that there is noth-
ing to worry about so long as no tangible, physical evidence is seized.
You can have a search and seizure without a physical seizing of property.
You can have a search by observation, by smelling, or by listening.
Let me give you some illustrations. Where it has been thought that
homosexual activity was occurring within the confines of a pay toilet,
poHce officers have drilled holes in the ceiling so as to be able to observe
the activities of persons within the toilets. Some coiuts have held that
such activity constitutes a search, and must meet the usual legal stand-
ards pertaining to probable cause and the need for a warrant.- If these
standards are not met, the police officer's testimony as to what he ob-
served within the toilets will be excluded.
Similarly, in the area of electronic eavesdropping, when an officer
uses some kind of bugging device, a spiked mike for example, and picks
up a conversation, he obviously is not seizing anything tangible. Yet, this
activity probably will constitute a search, subject to the usual require- 1
ment of probable cause and proper warrant.^ If these requirements are
not met, tlie poHce official may not use the evidence obtained as a re-
j
suit of his illegal search. This would mean that the tape itself would be
excluded, testimony concerning the conversation would be excluded, and
testimony and evidence which had been obtained as a result of the
eavesdropping would be excluded.
For many years the question as to whether a non-tangible seizure of
|
evidence (usually by secret observation or eavesdropping) was subject
to the rules of the Fourth Amendment depended upon whether there had
been an unlawful physical invasion of a protected physical area. Two
elements were required — first that there be a physical intrusion upon
the area involved,* and, second that that area be one constitutionally pro-
tected from that invasion.^ In the case I mentioned previously, that of the
officer who looked through the window of a car parked in the street,
neither element was present. There was no physical invasion so long as
the officer was only looking into the veliicle and did not, for example,
reach into the car. Moreover, the area involved — the inside of the car —
was oi>en to view by any member of the public and hardly could be con-
sidered a "protected premises" insofar as simple observation is concerned.
Accordingly, the officer had not engaged in a search and he did not need
probable cause to justify liis action. He could testify to what he saw with-
out regard to normal Fourth Amendment restrictions. I
On the other hand, some cases of non-tangible observation clearly
did involve a physical invasion. Take the case in which officers, without
1 People V. Mallory, 2 Mich. App. 359; Boyd v. United States, 286 Fed. 930
(4th Cir. 1923). See also United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
2 See e.g., Bielicki v. Superior Court, 371 P. 2d 288, 21 Cal. Rep. 552 (1962).
^ Silverman v. United States, 356 U.S. 505 (1961).
4 See e.fr., Jones v. United States, 339 F. 2d 419 (.5th Cir. 1964).
^ See e.g., Hodges v. United States, 243 F. 2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957).
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probable cause, broke into the house, and then observed people in the
next room engaged in illegal activities. Assume these officers later made
arrests and wanted to testify as to what they observed. Since their action
in breaking into the house clearly constituted a physical invasion of pro-
tected premises, their testimony would not be admitted.^
The presence of physical penetration was not always an issue to de-
termine. A detectaphone employed outside the house for purposes of
hearing conversations within was upheld as not constituting a physical
invasion.''' On the other hand, a spiked microphone that was first at-
tached to the wall, even though there was a minimum penetration, did
constitute a physical invasion.® This type of distinction could be carried
to preposterous extremes. We had a California case, for example, where an
officer followed a prostitute and customer to her hotel room and, by
peeking through a hole in the hotel door, obsei-ved the prostitute plying
her trade. Later when the officer tried to testify to this, the question arose
as to whether there had been a physical penetration of that room. The
court suggested that this might depend upon whether the officer had
drilled the hole in the door or whether it had been there before. Apparent-
ly in some areas holes had been drilled into all the doors in this particular
type of hotel, and in tliat case the officer himself would not have phy-
sically penetrated the premises.^ Similarly, in the pay toilet cases, there
was some concern as to whether the observations came from vents which
are a natural part of tlie physical layout, or whether special holes had
been drilled in the ceiling for observation purposes.
A recent Supreme Court decision suggests that courts need no longer
concern themselves with this type of issue. Katz v. United States,'^^ de-
cided in December 1967, seems to estabHsh new guidelines in determining
when observation on eavesdropping will constitute a search subject to the
Fourth Amendment.^^ The defendant Katz was convicted of transmitting
wagering information from Los Angeles to Miami, a federal offense.
At trial the Government attempted to introduce evidence of tlie defendant's
end of telephone conversations overheard by FBI agents who had attached
an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the pubHc
telephone booth from which the defendant had placed his calls. The case
was presented to the United States Supreme Court and raised two issues:
Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area
6 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Wliitley v. United
States, 237 F. 2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
7 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
8 Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) rev'd. 204 Va. 275 (1963); Silverman
V. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
9 People V. Ruiz, 146 Cal. App. 2d 630.
10 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11 The Katz case was decided after October 11, 1967 lectme at East Lansing and
the following is a substantial revision of what was said tliere.
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is necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Whether a pubhc telephone booth is a constitutionally protected
area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening
recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation
of the right to privacy of the user of the booth.
The United States Supreme Court gave a flat answer to the first
question — "no," physical penetration is not necessary. If Katz's conver-
sation within the booth was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, the
eavesdropping would constitute a search irrespective of whether the
bugging device was located inside or outside the booth. The distinction
formerly drawn between the use of the detectaphone placed outside the
wall and the spiked mike which penetrated the wall was soundly re-
jected. Either constituted a search if the area invaded was protected.
You will recall the second question presented in Katz was whether
the telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area. The Govern-
ment argued that even if eavesdropping Mdthout physical penetration
could constitute a search, all that had been searched there was a semi-
public area which was not entitled to constitutional protection. The United
States Supreme Court answered that argument in the following words:
. . . Any effort to decide whether or not a given area,' viewed in
the abstract, is constitutionally protected' deflects attention from the
problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection .... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. . . .
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which
the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that
he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had
remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered
the booth was not the intruding eye — it was the uninvited ear. He
did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from
a place where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a
business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a
telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fouiih Amend-
ment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the
toll that permits him to place a call, is surely entitled to assume that
the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world.
It strikes me that the United States Supreme Court here is not rejecting
the concept that some areas are constitutionally protected from search
(absent probable cause) while other areas are not; all it seems to be say-
ing is that the degree to which an area is protected depends upon the
nature of the invasion. The defendant could hardly complain if police
testified as to their observation of his actions in a glass-enclosed telephone
booth. It was a different matter insofar as his conversation was concerned.
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What he said in the booth, he could reasonably assume was private; what
he did obviously was not. Just the opposite situation may be true, for
example, in the case of the pay toilet where the mere presence of foiur
walls may be assinned to give one protection against observation, but the
paper-thin quahty of the walls may put one on notice that his conversations
are Hlcely to be overheard.^^ jj^g crucial question, as Katz poses it, is
whether a reasonable man could assume that he would be free from the
type of invasion presented in a particular case. Of course, even if the
answer to this question is "y^s," this does not mean that evidence as to
what was observed or overheard cannot be introduced. A "yes" answer
only means that the search is subject to Fourth Amendment limitations re-
lating to probable cause and a proper warrant. If these limitations are
met, then the search will be upheld.
How does Katz affect cases of secret observation? When will observa-
tion constitute a search subject to the Fourth Amendment? The answers
to these questions seem fairly clear in some places, not so clear in others.
First, it would seem that if a person is observed in an area that is not
even protected for constitutional purposes against physical invasion and
search, such observation should not bring the Fourth Amendment stand-
ards into play any more than would the physical search. It might be use-
ful therefore to consider those areas which an officer can physically in-
vade and search without regard to Fourth Amendment Hmitations.
The traditional rule is that, insofar as residental premises are con-
cerned, constitutional protection includes only the curtilage. The term
"curtilage" is ordinarily defined as the "dwelling area and that area which
is immediately adjacent to the dwelling area." However, this definition
raises two types of problems. First, what about structures that are not
immediately adjacent, for example an unattached garage? Is that part of
the curtilage or can an officer just walk into an unattached garage at will
on the grounds that it is not protected by the search and seizure laws?
There is some dispute on this point.^^ It is very clear that attached garages
are part of the curtilage. Yet I would hesitate to rely on the theory that
because a garage is unattached it is not part of the dwelling and, there-
fore, you can enter and look around at will. It strikes me that a garage
is close enough to the house and is used for purposes sufficiently related
to the normal dwelHng purposes that you must consider the garage to be
part of the dwelling, part of the curtilage, and constitutionally protected —
at least against physical invasion. Now some may disagree with me on this,
but at least that is the safe way to play it.
Now, what about other buildings such as bams, smoke houses, chicken
houses, and similar structures that generally are far removed from a house
12 Cf., People V. Young, 214 Cal. App. 2d 143.
13 Compare People v. Oaks, 251 Mich. 253 (1930) with Care v. United States,
231 F. 2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956). See also Walker v. United States, 225 F. 2d 447 (5tli
Cir. 1955).
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or dwelling. Again, there is some division on this poitit.^* For some courts
a bam is just like a man's office, and since a man's office is protected
against a search unless the officer has probable cause and a warrant, the
bam should be also. On the other hand, other courts have argued that,
if an officer walks into a bam, it is just like walking in an open field and
anything he happens to see is his to look at and, if it is contraband, to take.
I certainly think, however, that you are risking ultimate reversal if you
treat the bam as the equivalent of an open area, at least where the doors
are closed. In this situation I think the officer should, if at all possible,
establish probable cause and get a search warrant.
What about fields, fenced and unfenced? When are they part of the
curtilage? You have two extremes. On one hand you have a man's fenced-
in back patio, twenty feet by twenty feet, surrounded by shrubbery.
If you are going to physically invade and inspect that area, you will
probably be conducting a search for constitutional purposes, just as you
would if you were inspecting the inside of the house. On the other hand,
if you are just walking across a farmer's back acres, perhaps land that is
not even fenced, then you have quite a different situation. You may well
be tiespassing but your "search" will not be subject to constitutional ob-
jection because the open field simply is not a protected area. Both the
United States Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme Court have so
held.i^
Now, I have suggested so far that the home, the garage, and the
bam (at least in some situations) are constitutionally protected against a
physical search. Would the same be true of an observational search of
those stnictures by a person located outside the structure? Even if an
officer could not enter for the purpose of making a search (absent proba-
ble cause, etc.), could he observe the occupants within one of these
structures by looking through a window, an open door, a skylight, etc.
Going back to Katz, it is clear that tlie constitiitional protection given to
an area may vary with the type of invasion of privacy involved. We have
always known, for example, that while an officer had to meet Fourth
Amendment standards to enter and search a car, there was no difficulty
when he inspected the inside of the car by merely looking through the
window.^*^ Would the same be true of house, bam, garage, etc.? Yes, if
the officer, Hke the one looking through the car window, was in a place
where he clearly had a right to be; e.g., in the public street.^'^ But what
if he peers through the window from the front porch or from a window
at the side of the house. How will that be decided in the light of Katz?
1^ Compare Walker v. United States, 225 F. 2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955) with Hodges
V. United States, 243 F. 2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957).
1"' Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1923); People v. Ring, 267 Mich. 657
(1934). But cf. People v. Ubbes, 374 Mich. 571 593-595 (1965).
^^ See note 1, supra.
i'^ Or the public portions of a store. See Fisher v. United States, 205 F. 2d 702
(D.C. Cir. 1953).
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The courts could say that every person is aware that someone might come
upon his property and look through windows, and therefore, so long as
the shades are up, etc., such a person is no more protected against secret
observation than Mr. Katz is in his telephone booth. I doubt, however, that
that will be the case. The courts are much more likely to make their
answer dependent upon whether the officer had a "trespassory purpose"
— i.e., whether his purpose in approaching the house or garage was solely
to look through the window. A similar approach has been suggested in a
related context.
Assume an officer knocks on a door, the occupant opens it to see who
is there, and, as he does, the officer spots narcotics on the table. There
wiU be difficulties here if the officer says that the reason he knocked
in the first place was because he wanted to see if the occupants would
"open up" so that he might take a peek at what was insiders There would
be no difficulty, however, if the officer knocked on the door because he
wanted to talk with tlie occupant, and happened to notice the narcotics
on the table when the door opened.^^ At that point the visual observation
would not constitute a "search" for constitutional purposes; yet it would
provide probable cause for an arrest and a search incident to that arrest.
I beKeve this same type of approach will be apphed to observation
"searches," where the observation is made from defendant's property as
opposed to a public place. However, if the observation made from de-
fendant's property could be made only through the use of mechanical aids,
i.e., ladders, binoculars, etc., the courts may find this constitutes a search
even where the officer came upon the premises for some purpose other
than making the search. Under Katz, such observation arguably is the type
of invasion to which an occupant can reasonably assume he will not be
subject even from persons coming upon his property in the normal course
of social or commercial activities.
Under this type of analysis, it will be important to determine whether
a particular observation is made from a general public area, i.e., one to
which the public generally is invited. Take the case of a hotel, for ex-
ample. What will be the status of the hallways on the second, third,
fourth or fifth floor of the hotel? I am not talking about going inside a
room but only the hallways. It is sometimes argued that only the first
floor is open and after the first floor you are not supposed to be up there
unless you are a guest. This view, however, is not consistent with the
reahties of normal hotel practice. I think that this is a semi-public area
and subject to a visual search. There is no reason why officers cannot be
posted and observe what is happening in the hotel corridors, such as entry
18 Cf. Brock V. United States, 223 F. 2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955); California v.
Hurst, 211 F. Supp. 387 (D.C. N.D. Cal. 1962), Affirmed 325 F. 2d 891, reversed on
other grounds 381 U.S. 760 (1965).
^ ^„. ^^ .. j o. .
19 Polk V. United States, 291 F. 2d 230 (9th Cir. 1966); EUison v. United States,
206 F. 2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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and departure from a particular room. There is no more reason why you
cannot take this action than park across the street from a man's house,
and observe who is going in and out. The hotel corridor admittedly is not
a pubHc thoroughfare, but it is a semi-pubUc area which is largely open
to the public. At least I would take that approach until the courts indi-
cate otherwise. Rooming houses present a greater problem since their
corridors sometimes are not open to casual visitors without advance notice.
1 would suspect that in the rooming house situation it is always best to
get some consent before one advances beyond the first floor corridor.
So far, we have considered the impact of Katz only upon secret ob-
servation. What of eavesdropping? In cases where electronic devices are
not used, I suspect the standards will be quite similar to these appHed
to secret observation. If the officer heard what was said while located in
a pubhc place, there wiW not be a search for constitutional purposes. If
he was located on the defendant's property, then the crucial issue will be
whether he was there as a "trespasser." What was his purpose in being at
the side of the house when he overheard a phone conversation through
an open window? Was he on his way to the front door, or was he there
specifically for the pmpose of eavesdropping? These are the kinds of ques-
tions that I beUeve courts will be asking in cases of this kind.
Where electronic eavesdropping is used — at least where used to pick
up a conversation Mdthin a household, office, telephone booth, hotel room
or other area in which one cannot readily anticipate being overheard —
the eavesdropping will constitute a search for constitutional pmposes. This
means a warrant will be needed. I will not go into the requirements of the
warrant, whether a judge in Michigan could issue one without a specific
statute, etc. I think it is enough to say that if you intend to use electronic
eavesdropping equipment, you will clearly need the assistance of counsel
in obtaining a warrant; and you will not be able to sustain the search
without the warrant.
Having stated this as an absolute, there is one limitation I should
clearly make. I have been speaking so far about eavesdropping witliout
the consent of either of the parties. When one of the parties consents, it is
an entirely different situation. Thus, the courts have had little difficulty
with the admissibility of tapes of conversations between the defendant and
informers who were wired for soimd — at least where used to corroborate
the informer's own testimony.-^ Similarly, there is no constitutional objec-
tion to taping interrogations in police stations. Although one may argue
that the interviewee should know that what he says is being recorded, as
far as the law presently is concerned, it is adequate that either one of the
parties knows this, and, of course, the pohce inten'ogator would always
be aware of it.
-0 Lopez V. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
120
A word should also be said about wiretapping by police officers. If
taps are to be admissible in court, the officer must have a warrant. Even
with the warrant, however, the officer should be aware that if he divulges
the contents of what he heard, even on tlie witness stand, he is teclmical-
ly violating a federal statute that prohibits all interception and divulgence
without the consent of one of the parties.-^ Of course, this factor may be
viewed by state judges as precluding issuance of a warrant for wiretapping.
So far, we have no ruling on that point.^^
U
I would like now to turn to the area of search by consent. This
topic is not really related to the subject of secret observation and eaves-
dropping except in one sense: as in that area, there is the potential here
for legal acceptance of a search without meeting the Fourth Amendment
requirements of probable cause and vaHd warrant. If there is truly volun-
tary consent to a search, then the individual has, in effect, waived any
potential objection to the possible illegality of the search under Fourth
Amendment standards. The crucial question therefore is what constitutes
truly voluntary consent. The Michigan Court of Appeals has said:
It is well estabhshed that one may consent to have his person or
property searched by police officers, but such waiver or consent must
be proved by clear and positive testimony and there must be no
duress or coercion, actual or impHed, and the prosecutor must show
a consent that is unequivocal and specific, freely and intelligently
given.-^
A heavy burden will be placed on the prosecutor in showing a voluntary
consent; the courts have traditionally said that they will not lightly in-
dulge in the assumption that a man would waive his constitutional rights
by voluntarily consenting to a potentially illegal search.
Whether there has been true consent is often a matter of dispute. I
ain always very wary of relying upon consent to justify a search since it
so frequently involves disputed testimony. An officer will testify that he
told the resident of his rights and that the resident freely consented to the
search, while the resident will state that he never consented, but that the
officer forced his way into the house and conducted the search against
his will. It is so much easier, at least for the prosecutor, if the officer had
a warrant and there was no need to rely upon consent. However, this
cannot always be the case. I would therefore make the following sugges-
tions in consent situations. First, the more corroborating witnesses you
have, the stronger your case. Two officers are less likely to be disbelieved
than one. Second, use of a "consent form" is helpful.
21 47 U.S.C. § 605. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
2- See People v. Maranian, 350 Mich. 361 (1957).
23 People V. Nawrocki, 6 Mich. App. 46, quoting People v. Kaigler, 368 Mich.
281 (1962).
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Consent forms are not generally used by Michigan police, but police
in other states including IlKnois use them, as does the FBL^* The consent
form is a pi-inted foiin given to the individual, warning him of his rights
and stating that his signature gives his consent to a search. Any prosecutor
can prepare one. Use of such a form does not guarantee tliat you are
going to win your case, but at least it gives you concrete evidence that
diere was consent. If, however, the man refuses to sign, you are going
to have a hard time proving he ever consented by oral acquiesence.--^
Of course, even where the fact finder accepts the proposition that the
individual actually agreed to the search, the consent still may be rejected
on the ground that it was not voluntarily and freely given. There are
several factors the courts look to in determining whetlier a consent was
truly voluntary. One is whether the man was in police custody.^*" If he
was, that does not mean that he was automatically incapable of voluntary
consent, but it does suggest that he was under pressure to consent and that
he may have submitted to a search only because he thought that he had
no alternative. So when a man is in custody, particularly when he is in
jail, you must be especially careful in estabHshing a vaHd consent.
Even when a man is not formally in custody, there may be similar
factors that will cause courts to find that consent was not voluntary — for
example, a show of arms by the officers, or the fact that the request came
from several officers appearing at the door in the middle of the night.^'''
Another factor is the initiation of the suggestion of a search. If the
individual himself fii'st suggested that the police make a search, it is
easier to prove a voluntary consent. Consider the case of a wife who com-
plained that her husband was threatening to shoot her. The police came
over, arrested her husband, and then asked her for pei-mission to look
around for a gun. Although she had not initiated the idea of a search, she
had initiated the entire proceeding. The court was very willing to say
that obviously she wanted them to search for the gun, and therefore her
consent was completely volmitary.^
In most cases, however, it is the officer who initiates the suggestion of
a search and asks for consent. Exactly how the request is plirased will be
very important. Did he say, "I am here to search your house, any objec-
tions?" In that case, even if the person agreed, the court is likely to say,
"No valid consent."-^ Or did the officer say, "Would you mind if I searched
24 See e.g.. People v. Rogers, 133 N.E. 2d 16, lU. 2d 279 (1956).
25 Pekar v. United States, 315 F. 2d 319 (5tli Cir. 1963).
2C See Judd v. United States, 190 F. 2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Channel v. United
States, 285 F. 2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960). See also State v. Herring 421 P. 2d 767, 77
N.M. 232 (1966).
27 See Catalanotte v. United States, 208 F. 2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953); United States
V. Marquette, 271 Fed. 120 (D.C. N.D. Cal. 1920); United States v. Roberts, 179 F.
Supp. 478 (D.C. Cal. 1959).
28 People V. Shambley, 122 N.E. 2d 172, 4 III. 2d 38 (1954).
29 See People v. Kaigler, 368 Mich. 281 (1962); Farris v. United States, 24 F.
2d. 639 (9th Cir. 1928).
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your house? I£ you say no, I will turn around and go away." Obviously
this type of statement makes it much easier for the judge to find a volun-
tary consent.
The significance of the form of the request for consent suggests an
interesting question that is being raised by defense counsel throughout
the land. Miranda holds that before you interrogate a man you have to
warn him of his rights. ^"^ Do you have to do the same thing before you
ask him to let you search his car or house? The Nebraska,^^ Kansas,^-
Illinois,^^ Washington,^* and Louisana^^ courts have all indicated that you
do not have to give similar warnings. I would not rely on that though.
There are a few courts that have ruled the other way^^ and undoubtedly
this problem will eventually be decided by the United States Supreme
Court. That Court has indicated that it might very well extend the Miran-
da principle to search and seizure situations. Therefore, I certainly think,
if possible, one should "play it safe" and attempt to give appropriate warn-
ings in requesting consent to search.
What should such warnings contain? What are the defendant's rights
in this situation? I think the first thing you have to tell him is that he does
not have to let you search the house or the car. The second is that he can
insist that you go out and get a warrant (unless you intend to make a
search incident to an arrest). Third, he should be warned that any evi-
dence that you find can be used against him. Finally, I think you should
also tell him that he has the right to consult a lawyer, if he wants to, or
to consult anybody else. I do not believe, however, that you have to tell
him that he has a right to an appointed lawyer, because I do not think
he has that right under these circumstances. Certainly the police officer
cannot seek appointment of a lawyer in this situation. In fact, the circuit
court probably lacks legislative authority to appoint counsel prior to the
individual's arrest.
I think if you give these warnings in an effective manner, you aid
your consent case. It makes it much easier for the court to find a truly
voluntary consent. If the defendant knew that he did not have to consent,
that the poHce could have been required to get a warrant, that any evi-
dence found would be used against him, and that he could consult with
someone before he gave his permission, then he has substantially less basis
30 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31 State V. Forney, 150 N.W. 2d 915, 181 Neb. 757 ( 1967).
32 State V. McCarthy, 427 P. 2d 616, 199 Kan. 116 (1967) (involving the retro-
active apphcation of Miranda).
33 People v. Trent, 228 N.E. 2d 535 (lU. 1967) (involving the retroactive apph-
cation of Miranda).
34 State V. Johnson, 427 P. 2d 705 (Wash. 1967) (refusal to apply Escobedo to
search area).
35 State V. Andms, 199 So. 2d 867, 250 La. 765 (1967).
36 See United States v. Barton, 1 Criminal Law Reporter 2145; United States v.
Goggenheim, 1 Criminal Law Reporter 2127.
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for arguing tliat his consent was not voluntary.^^
Of course, even if tlie warnings are given, there may still be some
problems. Courts will also look to the spontaneity of the defendant's re-
sponse to the police request, i.e., the need for police persistence to gain
agreement. If you ask a person's consent for a search of his house and he
says "no," even though you could spend 15 minutes convincing him that
he should change his mind, you are very unUkely to get a court to uphold
the subsequent consent.^^ The original negative response is likely to be the
decision that stands. Of course, there may be occasional cases where this
will not be true. For example, the individual may have had doubts as to
the officers' identity and may have changed his mind after he was satisfied
that they were indeed plainclothes officers. Generally, however, if you have
to persist or pester to obtain consent, you are going to run into problems.
Another factor to be considered, even where warnings are given, is
the individual's capacity to understand. Do not expect to get a valid con-
sent from a drunk, a child, or a seriously retarded person.^^ In fact, we
have one case suggesting that you cannot get a vaHd consent from a
harassed housewife.^*^ The policeman there approached the woman shortly
after her husband and 16 year old son had returned home badly wounded
in a burglary attempt, had been treated by a doctor, and then had been
whisked away by the poHce. The housewife denied that she had ever con-
sented to the search, but the police claimed otherwise. The court held,
however, that she had been so upset and harassed that even if she had
consented, her action would not have been "voluntary."
Of course, the consent must extend to the speciEic area searched. You
have a famous Michigan case in which the police stopped an individual
for a traffic violation, and asked him if he had any contraband in his
car.^^ He said, "No, go ahead and search the car." The police were look-
ing for gambling paraphernalia, and after finding nothing in the car, they
asked the defendant if he had any materials on him. He had already given
his consent to search the car, but when the officer reached over to search
his person, the defendant drew back. The officer persisted, searched his
pockets, and found gambKng materials used in connection with football
pools. The police sought to introduce these materials in evidence and the
comt held they were fruit of an illegal search. Although the man had
consented to the search of his car, once the police started talking about
searching his person, he had drawn away from the officer. It was obvious
that he was not as willing to have his person searched as he was his car,
37 See e.g., Rogers v. United States, 369 F. 2cl 944, (10th Cir. 1966); State v.
Gates, 150 N.W. 2d 617 (Iowa 1967); Gornian v. United States, 1 Criminal Law Re-
porter 2189.
3« Pekar v. United States, 315 F. 2d 319 (5tli Cir. 1963); United States v. Zie-
mer, 291 F. 2d 100 (7th Cir. 1961).
3!> But cf. People v. Chyc, 219 Mich. 273 (1922).
'^o People V. Lind, 18 N.E. 2d 189, 370 111. 131 (1938).
41 People V. Ziegler, 358 Mich. 355 (1959).
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and with good reason. The consent did not extend to the search of the
person, and that search therefore had to be tested by Fourth Amendment
standards. Under these standards, of course, search of the person is not
justified as incidental to a traffic offense arrest.
The consent also must be current. In this connection, a recent Michi-
gan Court of Appeals case upheld a search in a strictly borderline situa-
tion.*2 The police arrested a man and asked liim if they could search his
car. The defendant gave his permission. The police searched the car but
found nothing. They took the defendant to the station and gave him back
his keys. He was booked, and he turned over his keys to the jailer. The
officers later returned and obtained the keys from the jailer. Their second
search was successful. They justified it in comt on the consent the de-
fendant originally gave when first arrested. The theory was upheld, but
the poHce here took a considerable gamble. The court could easily have
decided the other way. At the time of his consent the defendant was not
in jail and he was not sure he was necessarily going to jail. If the officers
wanted consent for another search they probably should have gone back
to the defendant and asked him again. Preferably, they should have ob-
tained a warrant so they would not have to tie their case to consent at
all.
There is one other aspect of consent which should be mentioned and
that is third-party consent. We are talking about consent by a person other
than the defendant. The usual rule is that vahd consent can be given by
any person with a sufficient interest to have possession and control of the
premises being searched. That means, for example, that the husband or
the wife can give permission to search the house.*^ The landlord cannot
give permission to search his tenant's quarters since he does not Hve in,
nor have possession or control of the tenant's quarters.** He can demand
entry on occasion to collect the rent or to find out if the tenants are
^damaging the furniture, but he does not have the right to authorize the
pohce to enter. The same is true for the hotel or motel manager, with
respect to a room presently leased,*^
On the other hand, a wife has complete control of the household. She
can authorize a search, and, if the poHce find something that points to the
guilt of her husband, they generally can use that evidence despite his
complaints about the validity of the search. There are certain hmits, how-
ever. First, the property searched must be jointly owned or occupied. If
the wife has left the household and she comes back to visit the husband
once every six months, it is not really her house and she cannot give you
42 People V. Nawrocki, 6 Mich. App. 46.
, .^^ ,„, ^. io^^n n i
43 See eg United States v. Heine, 149 F. 2d 485 (2d Cir. 1945); People v.
Penoni, 153 N.E. 2d 578, 14 111. 2d 581 (1958)
44 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961). ^ a aoa jy oA
45 Stoner v. CaMomia, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). See also State v. Roff, 424 P. 2d
643 (Wash. 1967).
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consent.*^ Also, her consent must be totally voluntary. I think therefore
that ordinarily the officer ought to tell the wife why he is searching the
home. For example, if the husband's under arrest, the officer had best tell
the wife this and state that he is searching the house to find evidence against
the husband. She also should be given the appropriate warnings as to her
own rights.
Finally, there may be areas where one spouse cannot consent to
search. While a wife can invite you to conduct a general search of the
house, perhaps she cannot authorize a search of her husband's toolbox;
that may belong solely to him.*'^ The same may be true of a car which is
registered in the husband's name and is regularly used only by him.
A special problem arises when one of the parties objects. If the hus-
I
band is present when the search request is made, and the wife gives her
JCb, consent but the husband does not, I would advise against relying on the
^ consent.^^ Go back and get a warrant and tlien you are safe. Of course,
there may be a likelihood of destruction of evidence, and then you will
have to take your chances on the consent.
Another difficult area of third-person consent arises out of the parent-
child relationship. A parent can consent to the search of a minor child's
bedroom.^^ A child cannot consent to the search of a parent's house.^° We
had a recent case in which the Michigan Court of Appeals, without much
discussion, held that a grandmother, who owned the house, could not con-
sent to the search of the bedroom of a grandson who lived in her house.^^
While the court did not emphasize this point, the grandson was over 18
and might well have been viewed as an adult boarder. Generally, the
person who owns the house, the head of the household, can consent to the
search in these situations.
The validity of consent given by temporary residents depends on the
nature of die individual's position. A babysitter left to care for die children
over an entire weekend obviously has more authority than a babysitter
who is in the house only for a couple of hours. Similarly, a household
painter cannot vaHdly consent to search the whole household, but a visit-
ing mother-in-law, placed in charge of the household, might be able to do
so.^- It is the police officer's duty to find out who is consenting to the
search and to make sure that this person is one who is likely to have
authority. If the person is only a temporaiy resident, the officer should
examine the situation closely before relying upon the consent.
Of course, even though a person may not be able to permit you to
search the premises, he may be able to permit you to enter the house.
4G See People v. Weaver, 241 Mich. 616 (1928).
4" See e.ff.. State v. Evans, 372 P. 2d 365 (Havi^aii 1962).
*8 C/., Tompkins v. Superior Court, 378 P. 2d 113, 27 Cal. Rep. 889 (1963).
49 Maxwell v. Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205 (D.C.E.D. Ark. 1964).
50 People V. Jeiuiings, 298 P. 2d 56 (Cal. 1956).
•51 People V. "Overall, 7 Mich. App. 153.
52 But cf. Reeves v. Warden, 346 F. 2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
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For example, a child answers the door, and, although he cannot permit
you to search the house, he can let you in.^^ That may be enough if, for
example, the officer immediately sees contraband lying on a table. Since
the officer was properly on the premises, his observation will not be
viewed as a "search" subject to Fom-th Amendment standards, and subse-
quent action can be based on probable cause furnished by the observa-
tion.
In addition some people can give you authority to inspect certain
portions of a building. For example, a janitor cannot let you into an apart-
ment, but he can let you look through the basement, through the hallways
and through those general areas to which all tenants generally have access.
(Of course, if these are semipublic areas, akin to hotel hallways, then
not even the janitor s consent may be necessary.
)
III
My last topic of discussion concerns method of obtaining entry. This
relates to both of the other topics. If a person obtains entry by fraud,
and then observes improper activities, does his observation become a
search for constitutional purposes because of the fraud? If he uses fraud
in obtaining consent, is it a vaHd consent? CoLuts have just begun to take
a long and careful look at these questions.
What are the rules established to date? An officer cannot misrepre-
sent himself as having a warrant when he does not.^* Misrepresenting
identity, however, is another matter and dependent on the circumstances.
Assume that a plainclothes officer approaches a place where the occupants ^
are selling narcotics, and gains entry by identifying himself as "Joe Doe,"^
sent by "Bill Smith" to make a purchase. Upon entry, he sees narcotics
activity and makes an arrest. His misrepresentation should not vitiate his
action.^^ He was invited into the premises, and in no way used his mis-
representation to force admittance. He is entering what is, in effect, a
place of business as a customer. On the other hand, if he identifies him-
self as the gas inspector who has to check on something, then he is run-
ning into trouble, since he is not really being invited into the house. He is
trying to exert public authority as an inspector to gain entry. Some au-
thorities argue the same would be true if the police officer gained entry
as a door-to-door salesman.^'^ The answer here is not so clear. However,
this technique is rarely necessary. The use of misrepresentation to gain
entry is primarily in the areas of narcotics and gambHng, and here the
poHceman can pose as a customer. This pose has clearly been accepted
by the courts. ^'^
53 See Davis v. United States, 327 F. 2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964).
54 Salata v. United States, 286 Fed. 125 (8th Cir. 1923).
55 Lewis V. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
56 United States v. Mitchneck, 2 F. Supp. 225 (D.C. Pa. 1933). „ , oqo
57 See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); United States v. Bush, 283




QUESTION: An adult relative is living in a room of someone's house.
Perhaps this resident is the sister or sister-in-law of the married man own-
ing tlie residence. Can the owner of his house authorize a search of the
occupant's room?
ANSWER: I think the situation becomes very questionable if that
relative Hves in and permanently occupies the room. Certainly the owner
can authorize the searching of the rest of the house. In the Overall case,
concerning the grandmother who consented to a search of an adult grand-
son's room, the Michigan Court of Appeals held the consent invaHd even
though the grandmother owned the residence. That case seems controlling.
Of course, there is little discussion on the point, and the court might
distinguish the case in a proper situation. Yet, leaving Overall aside, there
are other problems in relying on consent in this type of case. You may
find later that the relative was paying rent. Even if he or she cleans house,
does the dishes, etc., this might be the rent payment. Obviously this is a
fact that the officer could not discover in the first instance, yet if it made
the sister or sister-in-law a tenant, you would not have a case, even if
Overall were distinguishable. Because of these hidden booby traps con-
cerning the occupant's status, I think you are safest in not searching. How-
ever, if you need the information immediately, you are going to be forced
to take a chance and gamble.
Another problem arises where two unmarried people of the opposite
sex are living together. The courts have held that these individuals are
joint tenants, and as such I would treat them like man and wife, meaning
that either can give his or her consent to a search. To clarify this point of
joint tenancy, we are assuming that these people are, in fact, hving to-
gether, rather than, for example, a fellow having one girl over on Monday
and another in on Tuesday.
The courts have not dealt with the problem of husband and wife
living together but having separate bedrooms. I would not worry about
that, however, unless it is clear to the officer that this is the case. Ob-
viously, it is not a police officer's responsibility to seek out all the details
concerning a couple's marital relationship before making a search.
If an officer can reasonably determine that an individual seems to
have the authority to sanction a search, then he should go ahead and do
so — but beware of the adult occupant situation.
QUESTION: The following hypothetical question is in two parts:
A person has rented a room in a rooming house or motel-apartment build-
ing. The subject is behind in rent payments and the landlord beHeves the
subject has moved out. The landlord also felt that while a resident, the
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subject's actions were of a suspicious nature. The police are called to enter
and search, and as a result contraband is found. Is this search an illegal
one if (a) the resident has in fact not moved out, or (b) the subject has
left?
ANSWER: I think the crucial point, in this situation, is the reasonable-
ness of belief that the subject has abandoned the property not whether
he has in fact. The fact that he is behind in his rent is irrelevant so long
as he still has a lease on the property. The key issue is whether the facts
obtained from the landlord would support a claim of probable cause to be-
have the property has been abandoned. Of course, if the search reveals
that the subject is still hving there, you may have a more difficult time
in showing how you had reasonable cause to beheve he had abandoned
his property.
QUESTION: Are you famiHar with a coil device which is put on a
phone vidre, and yet does not penetrate the wire itself? If so, is this a wire-
tap or eavesdropping, and is it legal?
ANSWER: Yes, I am familiar with this device. It constitutes a wire-
tap, and as such is a violation of federal law, even though there is no
physical penetration of the wire. The interception concept of the Federal
Communications Act does not require physical penetration. What you are
doing with this device is picking up a telephone conversation from the
wires, and such action is subject to Section 605 of the Federal Communi-
cations Act.
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that such evidence as is
gained through this device would be excluded from the courts. However,
you could not hope for admission unless you had a warrant, authorizing
the tap. That warrant must meet the standards established in Berger and
Katz by limiting the duration of the tapped conversation, etc.
QUESTION: Would it be a violation of the Federal Communications
Act, or an illegal search, if an electronic device were placed on top of or
inside a pubHc phone booth located at a gambHng establishment?
ANSWER: It would not violate the F.C.C. However, as far as the
Fourth Amendment is concerned, Katz apparently would treat it as a
search, and a warrant would be needed.
QUESTION: What is the advisability of a police department using
an illegal wire tap or eavesdrop surveillance in order to gain evidence of
future crimes? If the future crime evidence is inadmissible, how far back
can this knowledge be pushed before it becomes fruit of a poisoned tree?
ANSWER: If the information leading to future crimes was obtained
by illegal wire tapping or eavesdropping, the courts would exclude that
information. However, there are Kmitations to the poison tree rulings. If
it is possible for the pohce to show that they would have obtained the
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same infoiination from other sources, or if the future crime is so remote
as to no longer be tainted by the wiretap or eavesdropping, the informa-
tion may be upheld.
Application of the poisoned fruit doctrine is difficult as a practical
matter since the defense counsel often does not know there was a wiretap,
or cannot prove there was a wiretap if he suspects it to be the source of
the prosecutor's information. The federal courts have held that the prosecu-
tor must tell the judge if there has been a tap. Also, once the proceedings
have revealed the illegal wiretap, the burden is on the prosecutor to show
that all the evidence did not come from the wiretap. If this is appUed to
local prosecutors, your use of the tap will be presenting them with con-
siderable trial difficulties.
QUESTION: The following is a hypothetical question. A subject is
arrested for violation of the check law. During his confinement in the
county jail, and while awaiting prehminary hearings, officers go to his
home and obtain a signed waiver of consent to search, from his common
law wife. Under the waiver the officers are allowed to search for checks
and other evidence relative to the case. During the search a revolver is
discovered, seized by officers, and after a file check, found to be stolen
from a tavern during a burglary six months earlier. Is the first search legal
and would the seizure of the gun also be legal?
ANSWER: I would think the first search would be legal if the com-
mon law wife gave her consent while beuig fully aware of her own
rights and tliat her husband was in jail. There are some people, law profes-
sors particularly, who are quite concerned about the situation your hypo-
thetical question raises (the man in jail whose wife is confronted for
consent to search). The fact of the matter is, however, that the courts
have upheld these voluntary consents given by the wife when she knows
aU the facts. As for seizure of the gun, no matter what the purpose of the
search, you can seize contraband found within the appropriate area of
search. I assume the gun was found in a drawer or other place where it
was appropriate to search for checks. The difficulty here is that the police
seized the gun before they made the registration check that showed it was
contraband. At the time they seized the gun, they had no basis for taking
it.
QUESTION: Can a subject, arrested for driving while under the in-
fluence of alcohol, give his consent for a blood test or a breathalizer exami-
nation?
ANSWER: Under Michigan's new statute, the subject can give his
consent to these tests when arrested for driving while under the influ-
ence of alcohol. Constitutionally, it does not matter whether he gives his
consent or not because when the officer made the arrest he had probable
cause to believe a crime was being committed. Ordinarily, you might need
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a search warrant to conduct this kind of search; but in this case it is not
necessary since if you took the time to obtain the warrant all the alcoholic
content would have left the subject's blood stream.
Although this statute is labeled "imphed consent" you do not, in fact,
have to base this statute on consent at all, but on probable cause to make
a search. This is the theory on which the imphed consent cases will be
sustained. However, there is no doubt that the statute seems to be in-
consistent when it talks about a valid consent by a driver who is thought
to be so intoxicated he cannot handle a car properly.
QUESTION: Once a person living in a residence has given an officer
his voluntary consent to search the premises, and the officer has begun
the search, can this resident then withdraw his consent?
ANSWER: Yes. The Miranda case ruled tliat a person who starts
to waive his rights against self incrimination can always withdraw that
consent and I believe the same rule would be appHcable to the search and
seizure area. Of course, if the resident stops the search at any point, any-
thing the officer has found up to that point is still admissable.
QUESTION: Can a private citizen, not involved in any crime or crime
investigation, but purely for personal interest, legally utilize the induction
coil to monitor his own phone conversations without the consent of the
conversing party?
ANSWER: The Federal Communications Act states that interception
is legal with the consent of one party. This case would be no different
than a man asking his secretary to listen to an extension and note the
conversation. In fact, this practice is common among some attorneys. Re-
cently adopted Michigan C.L. § 750.539(a) does not contain any "consent-
by-one-party" exception, but § 750.540 still does and I gather that it con-
trols taps, as opposed to other types of eavesdropping.
QUESTION: Does your previous answer apply to the police officer,
acting in this capacity, who records his conversation with someone? In this
case can the recording be used as evidence?
ANSWER: Yes, the recording can be used as evidence if (1) it's of
his own conversation, and (2) the officer's willing to testify so that the
recording corroborates his own testimony.
QUESTION: Are you famihar with paraboHc or strategem mikes?
If so, would it be an intrusion or an illegal search to monitor conversations
from a distance, for example, across the street and into a private home.
ANSWER: Under Katz, you could do so only if you had probable
cause and obtained a proper warrant. The more difficult question con-
cerns the use of the milce to pick up conversations in public places - e.g.
on the street. Can a person here claim that he was relying on the fact that
he saw nobody in the street who could overhear his conversation, that he
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was, in effect, caught unawares? Certainly, this argument has not been
succassful where mechanical devices are used for secretly observing a
person's activities on a public street. Secret eavesdropping, however, might
be treated differently, since the individual's expectations as to observation
and eavesdropping are, in common experience, likely to be quite different.
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